8 Moral Agency: Responsibility and Moral Luck
Calum McCracken
Table of Contents
Introduction
Nagel’s theory of moral luck explores how a myriad of external influences and antecedent circumstances problematize our conventional moral assessments. Nagel classifies this as a problem of moral luck, which he articulates as follows: “Where a significant aspect of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck” (Nagel 1993, 203–4).
Indeed, the issue arises from the generally accepted principle that we are only morally assessable to the extent that causal factors for which we are being assessed remain within our control (known as the control principle). Nagel views this principle as intuitively appealing but ultimately flawed. Through the identification of various types of moral luck — resultant, circumstantial, constitutive, and causal — Nagel challenges our conventional assumptions by demonstrating how much of what we morally asses depends on factors outside the agent’s control. For example, the moral culpability of a driver who has caused an accident may hinge upon random circumstances up and down the causal chain, such as the presence of a pedestrian at the moment of the accident (Nagel 1993).
Building upon Nagel’s argument, Margaret Walker invites readers to reconsider conventional notions of moral agency and virtue in a world that is inherently unpredictable. Walker posits that the moral character of individuals is shaped not only by deliberate choice but also by the capricious whims of fate, rendering our agency “impure.” By introducing the notion of “impure agency,” which acknowledges that human actions are often shaped by external and unpredictable factors, Walker embraces a more holistic and compassionate understanding of moral responsibility (Walker 1991).
Links to the Material
- “Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency” by Margaret U. Walker (1991)
- “Moral Luck” by Thomas Nagel (2012)
Discussion Questions
- What questions does Nagel raise about agency and responsibility in relation to moral luck?
- How do external influences and antecedent circumstances impact moral assessment according to Nagel?
- How does Kant’s perspective on moral responsibility differ from Nagel’s views on moral luck?
- In what ways does Nagel’s analysis deepen our understanding of moral judgment and ethical assessment?
- What are some modern examples of constitutive luck? What about luck in circumstances that would impact a conventual moral assessment?
- In what ways does Walker argue that integrity, grace, and lucidity are essential virtues in navigating moral luck? Walker suggests that virtues can be influenced by external factors. What are some examples of constitutive moral luck influenced by external factors, and how does this complicate our understanding of moral character?
Thought Experiment
The Artist
Mette looked into the eyes of her estranged husband, but could find no flicker of remorse.
“You tell me you want us back,” she said to him. “But how can we do that when you won’t even admit that you did the wrong thing when you left me and the children?”
“Because in my heart I don’t think I did wrong, and I don’t want to lie to you,” explained Paul. “I left because I needed to get away to follow my muse. I went in the name of art. Don’t you remember when we used to talk about Gauguin and how he had to do the same? You always said he had done a hard thing, but not a wrong one.”
“But you are no Gauguin,” sighed Mette. “That’s why you’re back. You admit you failed.”
“Did Gauguin know he would succeed when he left his wife? No one can know such a thing. If he was in the right, then so was I.”
“No,” said Mette. “His gamble paid off, and so he turned out to be right. Yours didn’t, and so you turned out to be wrong.”
“His gamble?” replied Paul. “Are you saying luck can make the difference between right and wrong?”
Mette thought for a few moments. “Yes. I suppose I am.”
Source: The eponymous essay from Moral Luck by Bernard Williams in 1981. In The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten by Julian Baggini (2005, 289).
Further Reading
- “Moral Luck” by Dana K. Nelkin (2023) (in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Bibliography
Nagel, Thomas. Mortal Questions. “Moral Luck” in Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. pp. 24-38. https://research-ebsco-com.ezproxy.tru.ca/linkprocessor/plink?id=9e5089a1-0b73-34c4-a212-fb83a7ad64ea.
Nelkin, Dana K. 2023. “Moral Luck.” Edited by Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2023/entries/moral-luck/.
Walker, Margaret U. 1991. “Moral Luck and the Virtues of Impure Agency.” Metaphilosophy 22, no. 1/2 (January/April): 14–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24436913.
Baggini, Julian. 2005. The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten: And 99 Other Thought Experiments. London: Granta.
How to Cite This Page
McCracken, Calum. 2024. “Moral Agency: Responsibility and Moral Luck” In Introduction to Ethics, edited by Jenna Woodrow, Hunter Aiken, and Calum McCracken. Kamloops, BC: TRU Open Press. https://introductiontoethics.pressbooks.tru.ca/chapter/moral-agency-responsibility-and-moral-luck/.
